DIMUN 25

Dr.İlhamiTankut Anatolian High School Model United Nations Conference

UNSC

Agenda Item:

Facilitating measures for preventing non state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Under Secretary General: Ezo Ferda Topal

Academic Assistant: Ece Yiğit

Table of Contents

Letters

1.1. Letter from the Secretary-General

Greetings Esteemed Attendees,

As the secretary general of the conference. It is with great pleasure that I extend gracious hospitality and welcome you all, participants of DiMUN'25, which will be held in Antalya from June 27th to 29th.

As we gather for this Model United Nations conference, we look forward to thought-provoking debates, insightful dialogues, and meaningful opportunities for collaboration. The delegates of this conference may have enlightening discussions and foster their diplomatic skills. With committees exploring a wide array of historical topics, delegates are sure to be both challenged and inspired, cultivating their critical thinking and diplomacy throughout the experience.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the organizing team and academic team for their dedication and hard work in order to raise DiMUN'25 to the pinnacle!

Furthermore, it is important not to place undue pressure on yourself before or during the conference. All participants are here to enhance their personal and academic growth while engaging with new peers in that kind of conference, so please be reminded of that. Therefore, remember to enjoy the experience and make the most of your time. Stay tuned for an enriching and memorable event.

Sincerely,
Erdem Demirci
Secretary-General
DiMUN'25

1.2. Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to this year's session of the United Nations Security Council. It's truly a pleasure to be serving as your Under-Secretary-General, and I'm looking forward to what I know will be a challenging, insightful, and rewarding few days.

Our agenda this year centers on nuclear non-proliferation, an issue that sits at the very core of the UNSC's mandate to maintain international peace and security. This topic asks a lot from us. We'll be dealing with legal complexity, historical baggage, and very real geopolitical tension. But that's exactly why we're here.

Each of you comes in with a position to represent, but also with the opportunity to think critically, to question assumptions, and to propose creative, pragmatic solutions. I want to encourage you to really engage with the big picture, non-state actors, fragile treaties, the role

of nuclear-armed powers, but also to pay attention to the nuances: the procedural tools available to the Council, the value of negotiation, and the way language shapes consensus.

I know MUN can feel competitive and that's not necessarily a bad thing but don't let it get in the way of meaningful collaboration. The best delegates are the ones who know how to argue a point *and* build bridges. Speak with conviction, listen actively, and don't be afraid to take the debate in a new direction if the facts and logic are there to support you.

I'm here if you need anything. Whether it's clarification, feedback, or just to talk through a strategy. Let's make this a session where the work we do actually feels substantial, not just performative.

Wishing you all the best for a productive and engaging conference.

Warmly,
Ezo Ferda Topal
Under-Secretary-General
United Nations Security Council
DIMUN 2025

Introduction to the Committee

2.1. Mandate of the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the principal organ of the United Nations tasked with maintaining international peace and security. Established in 1945 under Chapter V of the UN Charter, the Security Council holds a unique and powerful mandate that distinguishes it from other UN bodies. Its authority is both broad and binding, enabling it to respond to threats to peace with legally enforceable decisions.

The primary responsibility of the UNSC is to **prevent and resolve conflicts** that threaten global stability. It achieves this by investigating disputes or situations that could lead to international tension, calling upon the parties involved to pursue peaceful solutions, and recommending methods for conflict resolution such as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration. When diplomatic efforts fail, the Council has the power to authorize enforcement measures including economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and even the use of military force.

The UNSC is composed of fifteen members; five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms. The permanent members hold significant influence due to their veto power, meaning that any substantive resolution requires their concurrence to pass. This veto

power ensures that major powers have a decisive say in matters affecting international peace, but it can also lead to political deadlock.

Decisions of the Security Council are binding on all UN member states, distinguishing the Council from the General Assembly, whose resolutions are generally non-binding. This binding authority enables the UNSC to act decisively and compel states to comply with international peace and security measures.

Beyond conflict prevention, the UNSC also has the mandate to establish peacekeeping operations, deploy monitoring missions, and support the enforcement of international sanctions. It can refer cases to international judicial bodies such as the International Criminal Court, and oversee disarmament efforts.

In summary, the mandate of the United Nations Security Council encompasses the maintenance of international peace and security through investigation, peaceful resolution of disputes, enforcement actions, and peacekeeping. Its binding decisions and authority to use coercive measures make it the most influential organ of the UN in addressing global security challenges.

2.2. Role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear weapons represents one of the gravest threats to international peace and security in the modern era. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), entrusted with maintaining global peace, plays a pivotal role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ensuring compliance with international non-proliferation norms.

While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) primarily handles technical verification and monitoring of nuclear programs, the UNSC holds the critical responsibility of enforcing compliance and taking action against violations. The Security Council's mandate allows it to respond decisively to threats posed by states or non-state actors pursuing illicit nuclear capabilities, utilizing a range of diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military tools.

A central framework guiding the UNSC's involvement is the **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**, which seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and encourage disarmament. When states are suspected of violating the NPT or developing nuclear weapons outside its framework, the Security Council can intervene to uphold international security.

One of the Council's most significant contributions to non-proliferation has been through binding resolutions that impose sanctions and restrictions on states such as North Korea and Iran. For instance, UNSC Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) imposed arms embargoes and economic sanctions against North Korea following its nuclear tests, aiming to pressure the country into halting its nuclear weapons development. Similarly, UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, providing a roadmap for Iran's nuclear program to be limited under strict international oversight, while allowing phased sanctions relief.

Beyond state actors, the UNSC also addresses the risk of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors, including terrorist groups, through Resolution 1540 (2004). This resolution obliges all UN member states to implement laws and controls to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of unauthorized actors, highlighting the Council's comprehensive approach to non-proliferation.

The UNSC's enforcement powers (sanctions), diplomatic pressure, and authorization of collective measures make it a cornerstone institution in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the Council's effectiveness can be affected by political disagreements among its permanent members, whose veto power may delay or block unified action. Furthermore, verifying clandestine nuclear activities remains challenging, requiring close cooperation with the IAEA and intelligence-sharing among states.

In conclusion, the United Nations Security Council serves a crucial role in the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Through its unique authority to adopt binding resolutions and enforce international law, the UNSC acts as a guardian of nuclear non-proliferation, seeking to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and promote global security.

Agenda Overview

3.1 Perception of Non-State Actors as Means of Combating Nuclear Marketing

Traditionally, non-state actors have been viewed as part of the problem when it comes to nuclear threats—mainly due to concerns about terrorism and smuggling. However, there's a growing recognition that **some types of non-state actors might actually play a constructive**

role in preventing nuclear proliferation, particularly in disrupting the illegal trade or "marketing" of nuclear materials and technologies.

Here, non-state actors can include **non-governmental organizations (NGOs)**, **academic institutions**, **private security contractors**, and even **tech companies** that help identify suspicious trade patterns or cyber threats related to nuclear facilities. These groups often operate with more flexibility than states or international organizations, and they can fill important gaps—whether through advocacy, technical innovation, or on-the-ground monitoring.

For example, civil society organizations have played a major role in promoting transparency around nuclear arsenals and export control violations. NGOs like the **Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)** or **Global Zero** have raised public awareness and lobbied for stricter controls. Meanwhile, **open-source intelligence communities**, such as Bellingcat, have demonstrated how satellite imagery and publicly available data can be used to monitor nuclear activity—sometimes more transparently than official agencies.

That said, this shift in perception raises some challenges. Not all non-state actors are neutral or credible. There are risks around **accountability**, **data privacy**, and **political bias**, especially when private groups influence public policy or sensitive security matters. There's also a concern that too much reliance on these actors might let states shift responsibility away from themselves.

In short, while non-state actors are still potential threats in some contexts, they're also increasingly seen as valuable partners in combating illegal nuclear marketing and building a more robust global non-proliferation framework.

3.2 Significance of Non-Nuclear Proliferation

Understanding why nuclear non-proliferation matters isn't just about preventing warfare between countries. It's about maintaining **global stability**, **preventing humanitarian disasters**, and **avoiding a dangerous arms race** that could spiral beyond the control of existing legal frameworks.

Nuclear weapons don't just pose a threat because of their destructive power—they also have a **deterrence effect** that can lock countries into long-term strategic standoffs. When more states acquire nuclear weapons, the chance of **miscommunication, accidental launches, or regional arms races** increases significantly. We've already seen this in places like South Asia, where tensions between India and Pakistan remain high partly because of their nuclear status.

Beyond that, the spread of nuclear technology to unstable regions or authoritarian regimes raises serious concerns about **human rights**, **governance**, and **compliance** with international law. Countries with poor transparency or weak regulatory systems are more likely to misuse nuclear programs—whether for covert weapons development or as political leverage.

Another key reason why non-proliferation remains a priority is the risk of **nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands**. Even if states maintain tight control over their arsenals, the more nuclear material that exists, the greater the risk of theft, smuggling, or sabotage by non-state actors. This is why both disarmament and securing existing stockpiles are vital components of global security.

Lastly, there's an economic and environmental dimension. Pursuing nuclear weapons often comes at the cost of investing in essential sectors like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Meanwhile, nuclear testing has historically left **long-term environmental damage** and **public health consequences**, especially in regions used as testing grounds by powerful states.

In short, nuclear non-proliferation is not just a goal of disarmament treaties—it's a global necessity to reduce existential risks, maintain international order, and promote sustainable peace.

Historical Background

4.1 Major Past Incidents Involving Non-State Actors and Present Nuclear Threats

While nuclear proliferation is typically seen as a state-level issue, the role of non-state actors has become increasingly significant over the past few decades. Particularly after 9/11, the international community has grown more concerned about terrorist groups and other non-state entities gaining access to nuclear material or technology.

One of the earliest high-profile concerns came with **al-Qaeda's nuclear ambitions** in the early 2000s. Intelligence gathered from Afghanistan suggested that the group was actively looking into radiological weapons, more commonly referred to as "dirty bombs." Although they didn't manage to acquire or develop any nuclear devices, the interest itself was enough to ring alarm bells internationally. The fear wasn't so much a fully-fledged nuclear weapon, but the potential to spread radioactive material in a major city, causing mass panic and long-term contamination.

Later, during the rise of **ISIS** in Iraq and Syria, similar concerns resurfaced. The group had access to some hospitals and research institutions that held low-grade radioactive materials. While again there was no evidence that they managed to weaponize these materials, their known intent to shock and destabilize raised justified fears about the potential misuse of nuclear or radiological substances.

We've also seen concerns expand into the **cybersecurity realm**. A key example is the **Stuxnet virus**, discovered in 2010, which is widely believed to have been a state-sponsored cyberattack targeting Iran's nuclear program. This showed how vulnerable nuclear infrastructure could be, not just to physical attacks, but to sabotage via cyber networks. It raised the possibility that non-state cyber actors might also target nuclear facilities in the future.

Beyond this, **nuclear smuggling** has remained a recurring issue. The **IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database** has recorded multiple incidents involving attempts to traffic uranium or radioactive material. While most of these cases involve small quantities or materials unsuitable for a nuclear weapon, they highlight persistent vulnerabilities, especially in regions with weak regulatory oversight.

Today, the nuclear threat landscape is far more complex than it was during the Cold War. Non-state actors, cyber risks, and illicit networks all contribute to a broader, more unpredictable challenge to global non-proliferation efforts.

4.2 Previously-Established Legal Frameworks

Over time, a fairly comprehensive legal regime has developed to deal with nuclear non-proliferation. These frameworks don't just focus on state responsibility but also aim to reduce risks related to non-state actors and terrorist groups.

The most important pillar remains the **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**, signed in 1968. It's based on a bargain: nuclear-weapon states commit to eventual disarmament and help non-nuclear-weapon states with access to peaceful nuclear energy, while the latter agree not to pursue nuclear weapons. Almost every country in the world is a party to the NPT, making it the most widely accepted nuclear agreement globally. That said, challenges remain, particularly when it comes to enforcement and the perception that nuclear disarmament commitments by the major powers have been slow or inconsistent.

A major addition to the non-proliferation regime was **UN Security Council Resolution 1540**, passed in 2004. This resolution doesn't target specific countries but requires all UN member states to take steps to stop non-state actors from getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear ones. It was a direct response to fears that terrorists might try to build or acquire such weapons, especially in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

There's also the **International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)**, which focuses on criminalizing and prosecuting acts involving the use of nuclear materials for terrorist purposes. The Convention encourages cooperation between states and reinforces the idea that the nuclear threat isn't just about deterrence anymore—it's also about law enforcement and prevention.

The **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**, adopted in 1996, is another major legal instrument. It bans all nuclear test explosions, but unfortunately, it hasn't entered into force yet because some key countries—like the U.S. and China—haven't ratified it. Still, it's seen as a critical step toward disarmament and has helped build a global norm against nuclear testing.

Lastly, we have the system of **IAEA safeguards agreements**, which are required under Article III of the NPT. These agreements allow the IAEA to verify that states are not

diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to weapons programs. Many countries have also signed **Additional Protocols**, which give the IAEA more access and information—helpful in detecting undeclared nuclear activities.

Conclusion

The threats posed by nuclear proliferation have evolved significantly. Non-state actors, cyber vulnerabilities, and illicit trafficking have all complicated the global picture. At the same time, the international community has developed a fairly robust legal framework—led by the NPT, UNSC resolutions, and conventions—that aims to address both traditional and emerging threats. While enforcement and political will remain challenges, these frameworks still form the backbone of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Atomic-Stemmed Agonies of Today

In an age defined by rapid technological change and growing global instability, the nuclear question has re-entered global discourse with sharper urgency. While Cold War rhetoric once framed the arms race in binary terms, today's nuclear anxieties are shaped by a multipolar reality where state and non-state actors alike, backed by advanced technology and fractured diplomacy, are reconfiguring the traditional logic of deterrence.

5.1 Technological Advancements and Their Impact

Recent technological advancements particularly in artificial intelligence (AI), ballistic missile development, and nuclear miniaturization have added dangerous layers of unpredictability to nuclear strategy. The emergence of **hypersonic missile systems**, for instance, reduces reaction time for states to identify threats and respond, weakening the traditional concept of "mutual assured destruction" and increasing the risk of accidental escalation.

Moreover, **cyber vulnerabilities in nuclear command and control systems** pose novel threats that existing treaties are ill-equipped to address. The possibility of a cyberattack misrepresenting a nuclear launch or disabling deterrence infrastructure is no longer science fiction, but an operational risk. At the same time, developments in **civilian nuclear**

technology, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), blur the line between peaceful use and latent military potential.

Importantly, these innovations are occurring in a global context where arms control regimes such as the INF Treaty or the JCPOA are either weakened or under stress. The existing legal framework, largely built during the 20th century, is struggling to keep pace with 21st-century threats.

5.2 Key Regions of Interest

Nuclear tensions are not geographically neutral. Certain regions have become focal points of concern either due to ongoing conflict, political instability, or historical grievances.

- **The Korean Peninsula** remains one of the most volatile nuclear flashpoints. Despite multiple rounds of diplomacy, the DPRK continues to develop and test nuclear weapons in defiance of UNSC resolutions, threatening regional and global security.
- In the **Middle East**, the collapse of the JCPOA and growing uncertainty around Iran's nuclear intentions have reignited fears of a regional arms race. States like Saudi Arabia have hinted at pursuing nuclear capabilities if Iran crosses certain thresholds, deepening instability in an already fragile region.
- **South Asia** presents a different challenge: India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed and outside the NPT framework, have a long-standing rivalry compounded by territorial disputes. The absence of a formal arms control regime between the two only heightens the risk of miscalculation.
- In **Eastern Europe**, the war in Ukraine has triggered the most direct nuclear threats from a major power since the Cold War. Russia's rhetoric around tactical nuclear weapons and NATO's nuclear sharing policies have reawakened European fears of escalation.

Each of these regions demonstrates how nuclear proliferation today is no longer a matter of quantity, but of **context** who has the weapons, how they're integrated into national defense strategies, and whether diplomacy can meaningfully restrain their use.

BLOC Positions

In the discourse on nuclear non-proliferation, state behavior is often shaped less by abstract principles and more by strategic interest, regional dynamics, and historical positioning. As such, understanding the bloc alignments of key players, particularly the **P5 (Permanent Members of the UNSC)** and the broader divide between **Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS)** and **Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS)**, is essential for anticipating debate, resolution language, and potential alliances.

6.1 P5 Members' Stances

The five permanent members of the Security Council -**China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States**- each possess nuclear arsenals and have historically framed themselves as both protectors and regulators of the international nuclear order. However, their policies diverge sharply in both rhetoric and implementation.

- **The United States** continues to emphasize deterrence, modernization of its nuclear triad, and strategic stability through alliances (e.g., NATO). While a vocal proponent of non-proliferation, its selective approach to disarmament—especially withdrawal from agreements like the INF Treaty—has drawn criticism.
- **Russia** positions itself as a strategic counterweight to NATO and has made thinly veiled nuclear threats during conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. While it remains formally committed to the NPT, its actions suggest an increasingly aggressive nuclear posture.
- **China** maintains a policy of minimum deterrence and "no first use," but has significantly expanded and modernized its arsenal in recent years. It often pushes for multilateral disarmament, but resists being held to the same standards as the US and Russia.
- **France** advocates for a strong European nuclear deterrent and is a supporter of arms control, but emphasizes the need for strategic independence. It has been reluctant to engage with newer disarmament frameworks like the TPNW.
- **The United Kingdom**, while aligned with the US on nuclear doctrine, has faced domestic debate over the cost and relevance of its Trident program. It maintains that its arsenal is minimal and strictly for deterrence.

Despite their common status under the NPT as recognized nuclear powers, the P5 are not a unified bloc on nuclear matters. Their differences reflect broader geopolitical rivalries and varying levels of engagement with disarmament efforts.

6.2 Policies of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) vs. Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS)

The divide between **NWS and NNWS**, institutionalized by the NPT, has long been a source of tension within international law and diplomacy. While the NPT allows the five P5 states to retain nuclear weapons under Article IX, it also obligates them to pursue disarmament under Article VI, a commitment many NNWS argue has been inadequately fulfilled.

- **NWS**, both inside and outside the P5, generally view nuclear weapons as essential to their national security and geopolitical leverage. These states prioritize **non-proliferation enforcement**, often via the IAEA and the UNSC, but are **less consistent in pursuing actual disarmament** or engaging with newer agreements like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
- **NNWS**, particularly those from the Global South, often highlight the inherent inequality of the NPT framework. Many have supported the **TPNW as a moral and legal alternative**, aiming to stigmatize nuclear weapons outright. Additionally, blocs such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition advocate strongly for time-bound disarmament commitments and regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

This tension often plays out in MUN debates and real-world diplomacy alike. NNWS argue that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime hinges on reciprocal commitments, while NWS insist that strategic conditions -rather than legal obligations- will determine the pace of disarmament.

Ultimately, understanding these bloc dynamics is key to constructing policy that balances **security concerns with legal obligations**, and that moves toward a more inclusive and enforceable nuclear governance regime.

Measures Taken So Far

7.1. National Efforts and Domestic Legislation

The Zwentendorf Nuclear Power Plant in Austria, completed in 1978, was shut down after a referendum without ever being put into operation. In the Philippines, the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which was completed under Marcos, was not put into operation due to thousands of engineering errors and safety concerns. Brazil, on the other hand, abandoned its second nuclear power plant, which was under construction, and its third nuclear power plant, for which it had spent 1.1 billion dollars. As a result of a referendum held in 1980, Sweden decided in 2010 to phase out all its nuclear power plants, from which it derived 46% of its electricity, and began dismantling the Barseback-1 power plant in November 1999. As a result of a referendum held in November 1987, Italy gave up nuclear energy and closed its 4 nuclear power plants, including Montalto di Castro, which was 70% finished. Germany shut down the SNR-300 Shield plant and the Hanau MOX plant, which had been completed in 1991, without ever operating them. Spain shut down the Lemoniz 1-2 and Valdecaballeros 1-2 plants, which were 92% completed in 1984. Belgium announced that it would close one of the plants as a result of intense pressure from the EU. The US shut down the Shoreham plant, which was finished in 1984, without commissioning it. Russia canceled dozens of previously planned power plant projects after the Chernobyl disaster, the effects of which are still lingering. China has started to build the nuclear power plants it had previously ordered. "Asian Tigers" such as Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam abandoned their nuclear plans.

Other countries that have abandoned their nuclear plans are: Australia, Cuba, Mexico, Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Iceland, Scotland, New Zealand . Especially in the European Union countries, very serious decreases will be experienced: "The use of nuclear energy in candidate countries is on a downward trend, with the current share of 15% in electricity generation projected to fall to 8% in the 2020s".In Europe, only the Finnish Parliament: 107 votes against 92, approved the country's 5th nuclear power plant. According to the BP World Energy Report; "Worldwide nuclear power generation contracted by 2%, with Japan, the world's third-largest nuclear producer, suffering a massive 27% drop in output. US nuclear power generation also fell by 2%."

"According to the Nuclear Energy Data, out of the 32 planned nuclear power plants, 12 are in Japan, 81 in South Korea, 4 in China, 2 in Canada and 1 each in Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Korea, Pakistan. However, after the accidents, Japan had to abandon its plans for 12 nuclear power plants, except for 3 under construction. Similarly, when an accident similar to the one in Japan occurred at Korea's Wolsung Nuclear Power Plant in October 1999, Korea also entered a waiting period.

Ireland’s Request (1958):

In 1958, Ireland submitted a proposal to the United Nations for the destruction of all nuclear weapons and their non-remanufacture. Ireland was the first country to propose the destruction of all nuclear weapons. The Acheson-Lilienthal report should not be confused

with Ireland's request, as it is about sharing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as opposed to the destruction of all weapons.

In one part of the letter, the Irish Government expresses its demands as follows:

"It has long been the position of successive Irish Governments that the use of strategic nuclear weapons would have disastrous consequences, given their indiscriminate character and the devastating impact they would have on humanity and the environment. Although tactical nuclear weapons are small in scale and less indiscriminate in their effect, there is a danger that their use could lead to the use and indiscriminate effect of strategic nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. For these reasons, Ireland insists that every effort should be made to achieve the total prohibition of all weapons in this category, and we work for and support it." (Government of Ireland, 1958)

7.2. International Approaches and Predecessive Documents of the Security Council

Disarmament Conference:

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the evolution and institutionalization of the UN's role in the field of disarmament after it was established by Article 11 of the UN Charter.

Since 1998, the CD has not been able to reach an agreement on its work program, and the work program adopted in 2009 could not be implemented, and the expectation of a return to substantive work in the CD has not been met to date.

In the 1960s, as a result of concerns about nuclear tests and nuclear war, the UN General Assembly decided in 1961 that the Committee on Disarmament should conduct negotiations on disarmament. In 1978, the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD-I) was held and at the end of this session, by consensus, the Committee on Disarmament was established as a multilateral disarmament negotiating body. This body was renamed the "Conference on Disarmament" (CD) in 1984.

Under its various names, the CD laid the groundwork for the preparation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Outer Space Treaty (1967) between 1962 and 1978.

The CD also includes the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT - 1968), the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Placement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Territories Under Them (Sea Bed Treaty - 1971), It has concluded the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC - 1972), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Military or Any Other Evil Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC - 1993) and the Treaty on the Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Testing (CTBT - 1996).

With 65 members, the CD is the only body authorized to negotiate on international disarmament issues. The CD has a Secretariat and a Secretary-General of the Conference appointed by the UN Secretary-General in consultation with member states (the

Secretary-General of the CD is also the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the CD). Since January 9, 2014, the office of Secretary-General has been held by Michael Möller (Denmark), Acting Director of the UN Office at Geneva. The CD Presidency rotates in alphabetical order, with six Presidents serving each year.

The CD sets its agenda based on the elements adopted by consensus at the SSOD-I meeting. This agenda, adopted by consensus each year, consists of the following topics:

Ending the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
Prevention of nuclear war and related issues (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material - FMCT)
Preventing an arms race in space (PAROS)
Effective international arrangements to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states that they will not use or be threatened with nuclear weapons (Negative Security Assurances)
New types of weapons and systems of mass destruction; radiological weapons
Comprehensive disarmament program
Armaments transparency
Evaluation of the CD's annual report and other disarmament reports
The CD is an autonomous body outside the UN system, including its budget. It takes its decisions by consensus.
The CD meets annually for three periods of 24 weeks (ten, seven and seven weeks respectively). The Conference is obliged to submit an annual report to the UN General Assembly each year.

Turkey became a member of the CD on June 14, 1996 with a total of 23 countries. In the CD, where decisions are taken by consensus, Turkey is located in the Western Group, as in the geographical groupings of other UN bodies. Having served as the Western Group Coordinator in 2010, 2014 and 2018 (February 19 - March 16), Turkey assumed the sixth and final Presidency of the CD in 2018 (August 20 - September 14).

The Ottava Convention banning anti-personnel mines:

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and on their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Ottava Convention, entered into force for Turkey on March 1, 2004. Currently, the number of parties to the Convention is 164. Non-parties include the USA, Russia, Israel, India and Pakistan, as well as our neighbors Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and Syria.

Within the framework of the Convention, Turkey was obliged to clear landmines by March 1, 2014. Since our mine clearance activities could not be completed within the said period, our request for an 8-year extension (until March 1, 2022) was accepted at the 2013 Meeting of States Parties.

The law on the establishment of the National Mine Action Center within the Ministry of National Defense to manage and coordinate mine clearance activities in Turkey was adopted on 22 January 2015. The Center has been operating under the name of the Turkish Mine Action Center (MAFAM) since February 2015.

-Certain Conventional Weapons Convention

The "Convention on the Prohibition or Limitation of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which are Extremely Injurious and which have Indiscriminate Effects" was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981 and entered into force on 2 December 1983 for ratifying States. To date, 125 countries have become parties to the Convention, also known as the "Certain Conventional Weapons Convention" (CCW).

There are five Protocols to the CAT.

Protocol I: Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
Protocol II: Protocol On Prohibitions or Restrictions On The Use Of Mines, Booby-Traps And Other Devices
Protocol III: Protocol On Prohibitions or Restrictions On The Use Of Incendiary Weapons
Protocol IV: Blinding Laser Weapons: (Protocol On Blinding Laser Weapons)
Protocol V: Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the CAT, accession to any Protocol to the Convention is optional, and ratification of the CAT together with two or more Protocols is considered sufficient to become a party to the Convention.

Turkey, which signed the CAT in 1982, subsequently became a party to the Convention and the Additional Protocols I, II and IV, as amended by the amendment to Article I of the Convention, on March 2, 2005, by making a reservation to the Convention. The Convention and the Protocols entered into force for Turkey on 2 September 2005.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BSS was opened for signature on April 10, 1972 and entered into force on March 26, 1975. Turkey ratified the Convention on June 15, 1974. Currently, 178 countries are parties to the Convention. There are six countries that have signed but not yet ratified the Convention.

The BSS prohibits the use of biological weapons in war or aggression, as well as the production, stockpiling and possession of material capable of producing biological weapons for other than peaceful purposes. The Convention obliges States Parties to destroy biological weapons in their possession within the first nine months of entry into force.

- Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The Arms Trade Treaty aims to regulate the international conventional arms trade or to improve existing regulations, as well as to prevent illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent the diversion of these weapons for other purposes.

With the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty on December 24, 2014, a universal, legally binding instrument that establishes the highest possible level of common rules for arms transfers has been put in place.

The Treaty has already been ratified by 99 countries and signed by 36 countries. Turkey signed the Treaty on July 2, 2013 and the ratification process is underway.

Demeterialized Munitions Contract (DNMS)

The issue of restricting the use of cluster munitions (DNM), also commonly referred to as "cluster bombs", has been on the agenda of the international community since 2006. The restriction of the use of DNM was first addressed within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CKSS), but after negotiations at the end of 2006 failed to produce any significant results, a new body led by Norway, with the core group of countries directing its efforts, launched an initiative known as the "Oslo process to ban DNM that cause unacceptable harm to human beings" in a separate arrangement outside the CKSS.

The "Convention on Cluster Munitions" (DNMS), which was put forward at a conference in Dublin in May 2008, was opened for signature at a meeting in Oslo on December 2-4, 2008.

There are 104 parties and 107 signatory countries to the Convention, which entered into force on August 1, 2010.

Mandatory Case Study

Questions to Consider Upon the Agenda

As the committee begins deliberations on nuclear non-proliferation and the role of the United Nations Security Council, delegates are strongly encouraged to reflect on the following guiding questions. These are designed not only to deepen your understanding of your country's position, but also to challenge prevailing assumptions, anticipate legal and strategic dilemmas, and shape nuanced solutions.

1. **To what extent should the UNSC prioritize disarmament alongside non-proliferation?**
   While preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a core element of the Council's mandate, many states argue that without real progress on disarmament by nuclear-weapon states, the system lacks legitimacy. Where should the balance lie?
2. **How can the Security Council address threats posed by non-state actors in the nuclear sphere?**
   The proliferation risk has expanded beyond states. What tools—legal, technical, or

diplomatic—are available to the Council to counter trafficking, nuclear terrorism, or the misuse of dual-use technologies?

3. **Are current verification and enforcement mechanisms (e.g. IAEA inspections, sanctions) sufficient to deter violations?**
   How effective are these mechanisms in practice, and what reforms or alternatives could strengthen them?
4. **Should there be greater legal accountability or consequences for P5 states failing to fulfill their Article VI obligations under the NPT?**
   Can the current system realistically hold major powers accountable? If not, what diplomatic or symbolic tools can be leveraged?
5. **How does regional security influence proliferation decisions?**
   In areas like the Middle East, South Asia, or East Asia, nuclear decisions are often driven by regional rivalries. How can the Council support confidence-building in such regions without undermining state sovereignty?
6. **What role should emerging technologies (e.g., AI in targeting systems, cyberattacks on nuclear infrastructure) play in future non-proliferation treaties or UNSC resolutions?**
   Should the Council begin defining global standards for how technology intersects with nuclear weapons strategy?
7. **Should the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) be supported or challenged within the UNSC framework?**
   Is the TPNW a legitimate step toward disarmament or a diplomatic dead-end due to lack of support from nuclear states?
8. **How can the Council ensure equitable participation and security guarantees for NNWS?**
   Are the security concerns of non-nuclear states being taken seriously enough? What kinds of multilateral arrangements could help bridge the trust gap?

These questions do not demand simple answers. They invite negotiation, legal creativity, and political realism. Delegates are urged to explore not only what is desirable, but what is feasible within the existing structures of international law and diplomacy.

Rules of Procedure Overview – Exclusive to the UNSC

The United Nations Security Council operates under a distinct set of procedural rules that differ from those applied in General Assembly-style committees. These rules are designed to reflect the binding nature of the Council's resolutions and the unique authority vested in its permanent members (P5). Understanding these procedures is essential for meaningful and accurate participation.

1. Membership and Observer Status

The UNSC consists of 15 member states:

- **5 Permanent Members (P5)**: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- **10 Non-Permanent Members**, elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.

In this simulation, **selected UN member states** have also been invited as **observers** to contribute to debate. Observer states may:

- Deliver speeches and participate in discussions.
- Propose amendments and working papers.
- **Vote on draft resolutions**, with the understanding that they may only vote **"in favor" or "abstain."**
- **They may not vote against any proposal, nor exercise veto power.**

This ensures the integrity of the Council's decision-making while allowing broader representation and insight from the global community.

2. Veto Power

Only the five permanent members (P5) possess veto power. During **substantive voting**, if any one of the P5 votes **against a** draft resolution, the resolution automatically **fails**, regardless of the number of affirmative votes.

Note:

- A **P5 abstention does not count as a veto** and does not block the resolution.

3. Voting Procedure

- For any **substantive matter** (resolutions, amendments), at least **9 out of 15 members** must vote in favor, **with no veto from any P5 member**, for the motion to pass.
- **Observers** do not count toward the 15 members required for passage, but their votes will be recorded.

Example: A resolution with 9 votes in favor, 1 P5 veto, 2 abstentions, and 2 observer approvals **fails** due to the veto, regardless of observer support.

4. Debate Structure

Debate is structured into **formal and informal segments**, often transitioning between:

- **Formal Debate**: Follows the speakers list. Used to present national positions and introduce documents.
- **Moderated Caucus**: Short speeches on a focused topic, allowing for rapid exchange.
- **Unmoderated Caucus**: Freeform negotiation; typically used for drafting documents or building coalitions.

Delegates should use these formats strategically based on the stage of the discussion and their diplomatic objectives.

5. Documentation and Drafting

Security Council documents are referred to as:

- **Presidential Statements** (non-binding)
- **Resolutions** (binding under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter)

All draft resolutions should reflect realistic international law language and clearly specify actions to be taken, by whom, and under what authority.

6. Crisis and Procedural Flexibility

Given the urgency and global impact of issues before the UNSC, the Chair reserves the right to introduce **crisis elements**or modify procedural flow to simulate real-world conditions. Delegates are encouraged to remain adaptable and strategic.

Final Note to Delegates

The unique nature of the UNSC calls for a higher level of legal precision, strategic negotiation, and political awareness. Whether you are a permanent member, a non-permanent member, or an observer state, your role contributes meaningfully to the outcome of this committee. Use procedure to your advantage, but never forget that diplomacy remains your most powerful tool.

Here's a properly formatted **References** section for your Model UN study guide. It includes a blend of **official UN documents**, **academic sources**, and **policy analysis**—written in a way that suits a third-year university-level law student working in a UN context. You can adjust the citation style depending on whether you're using Chicago, APA, or something else, but here it's in a formal academic format.

References

1. United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter
2. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt
3. United Nations Security Council. *UNSC Resolutions Database*. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions
4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols*. https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements
5. Arms Control Association. "The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): Overview and Status." Last updated 2024. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/TPNW
6. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. "Status of World Nuclear Forces." *Federation of American Scientists*, 2024. https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces

7. Sagan, Scott D. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 54–86.
8. Graham, Thomas Jr. *The Nonproliferation Treaty: A Historical Perspective*. International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002.
9. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). *Nuclear Risk Reduction: Concepts and Approaches*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2021. https://unidir.org
10. United Nations Security Council. *Rules of Procedure of the Security Council*. Provisional rules. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/rules-procedure
11. https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&&context=book_chapters&&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.google.com%252Furl%253Fq%253Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fscholarship.law.nd.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%25253Farticle%25253D1051%252526context%25253Dbook_chapters%2526sa%253DU%2526sqi%253D2%2526ved%253D2ahUKEwiWlb33k4WOAxVoc_EDHYJMC54QFnoECCAQAQ%2526usg%253DAOvVaw0PFwKteNT0TFpbzIH4Tp8m#search=%22https%3A%2F%2Fscholarship.law.nd.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1051%26context%3Dbook_chapters%22
12. https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_08_Nasu_15.pdf
13. https://youtu.be/C3AOm2FnBQ4?si=nloZRQ7SIqUYP2AO